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Abstract 
 
The opinion is occasionally voiced that investors should avoid paying tax at all costs. In this paper it is being 
investigated, using a simple portfolio model with taxes, whether avoiding tax really leads to more µ-σ-effi-
cient solutions. It is demonstrated for four different concepts of tax-minimising policy that they are a far cry 
from an efficient solution. 
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1. Problem Outline 
 
Considering the question on how to increase one’s net 
income, an investor has two options. He or she will ei-
ther look for opportunities to increase the pre-tax income, 
or alternatively to diminish tax payments. Many people 
are assumed to especially favor tax saving schemes. A 
few years ago, a German economist, Ekkehard Wenger, 
has written on this predilection, which he considers thor- 
oughly reasonable. Rationally acting investors would 
either make legal use of tax incentives in their invest-
ments, or even attempt tax evasion. Anyone acting dif-
ferently would be “maximizing stupidity” [1]. Regardless 
of whether one agrees or not with such drastic views, the 
rationale behind such a position seems to make sense. As 
a scientist however, one should be armed with a funda-
mentally skeptical outlook; easily comprehended matters 
do not always fit in with reality, as one readily learns in 
school from the conundrum involving Achilles and the 
turtle. 
Wenger’s considerations are relevant in view of em-
pirical analyses of the stock market. Fair evaluations of 
companies’ values are normally performed by using 
Capital Asset Pricing Models (CAPM). This involves the 
comparison with similar companies, in order to deter-
mine the so-called “beta factor” of the firm in question. 
Particularly the financial auditor profession is adamant 
that for this determination not the basic model of CAPM 
be used, but rather its tax-enabled version, the Tax- 
CAPM [2]. The values resulting from the respective uses 
of CAPM and Tax-CAPM can sometimes vary signifi-
cantly. If one subscribes to the opinion that tax payments 
reflect irrational behavior, it follows that Tax-CAPM 
will yield incorrect company valuations. Thus, the ques-
tion of whether saving taxes constitutes rational behavior, 
directly affects what a company is worth. 
In our present contribution we will, while using the 
framework of portfolio theory, examine whether a policy 
of minimizing taxes can be regarded as advantageous. 
For this purpose, we consider a simple portfolio problem 
from a tax perspective and attempt a characterization of 
all portfolios which are efficient under uncertainty. Such 
portfolios can be characterized as desirable even without 
more precise knowledge on the risk averseness of inves-
tors. On this basis we will examine the question, how the 
concept of “tax minimization” can be formalized in our 
context and if such concepts can be efficient. It will 
emerge that tax minimizers, while maybe considering 
themselves to be particularly clever, end up looking less 
than smart. 
We will concentrate our analysis exclusively on port-
folio theory and will not employ the CAPM. This proce-
dure follows from the goal we have set for ourselves. We 
would like to show that even rational investors can be 
willing payers of taxes, as they prefer a balanced after- 
tax structure of payments. What kind of macroeconomic 
result would be the upshot of such behavior is outside the 
scope of our work. 
 
2. The Model 
 
We use a formal model which is based on definitions and 
simplifying assumptions deemed appropriate. On this 
basis we will use logical operations to draw conclusions 
whose validity can be checked by an expert third person 
at any time. Given that we do not make mistakes during 




the logical operations, our results can only be legiti-





We are looking at a one period model under uncertainty. 
An investor has the option to invest in risky securities 
. The price vector of these investments is 
called 
1, ,j  
 1, , Jp p p . We notate future payments 
connected with the securities with jY
. We use the sym-
bol  for the vector of the ex-
pected cashflows. The covariance matrix of the cash-
flows is . It is assumed that the covariance matrix is 
regular. Therefore there are no redundant investments. A 
risk free asset will not be introduced. But we concentrate 
on the edge of an “eggshell-like surface” which may be 
interpreted as the geometric place of all desirable 
risk-return-positions and uses to be called the efficient 
set. 
 1 , ,Y E      JY E E


We imply an investor with nominal assets of  , who 
has already financed his momentary consumption and 
has to decide how to invest the amount   in the capital 
market. For that purpose he chooses a portfolio consist-
ing of  1, , JN N N   units of the risky assets. Short 
selling is not excluded. Therefore some entries in this 
vector may also be negative. When deciding on his in-
vestment the investor orients himself by the expectation 
value and variance. He thus has a utility function of the 
type  
 2,U   . 
According to our requirements the expectation value 
and variance of the future payments of a securities port-
folio are determined to N E    and . 
The price of the portfolio is given by the vector product 
. 
2 N N   
N p
In order to model the taxation an assessment basis as 
well as a tax-rate function is required. As assessment 
basis for a unit of the -th financial asset we us the dif-
ference between the risky cashflow and a riskless depre-
ciation which in the simplest case corresponds to the 
purchase price, but not necessarily. We term the vector 
of the depreciations of the risky assets as 
j
 1, , JA A A  . 
The rate function is linear, the tax rate   is secure. 
 
2.2. Efficient Portfolios before and after Taxes 
 
First we look at the decision under the simplifying assu- 
mption that no taxes are being levied. Then we deal with 
the classic problem of portfolio selection, introduced into 
the literature by Markowitz more than 50 years ago [3]. 
The investor can choose between positions charted on an 
 - 2 -diagram laid out on an eggshell-shaped surface. 
The most interesting points on this surface are those 
around the edge, as it is there that for any given expected 
wealth the variance will be minimal. All positions which 
are not situated on the edge are denoted as non-efficient. 
Any rational investor will attempt to occupy an  - 2 - 
efficient position. In order to determine these edge posi-
tions, a maximization problem 
max
N
N E                   (1) 
under budget constraints  
2andN p N N               (2) 
has to be solved. The first condition is a budget restric-
tion which ensures that the investor’s wealth is fully ex-
hausted; the second condition makes sure that the cash 
flow variance of a portfolio will reach an exogenously 
demanded level 2 . In order to fully determine the effi-
cient set, the optimization problem has to be solved for 
all possible 2  .1 Because short sales are not ex-
cluded, the optimization can be accomplished by using a 
Lagrange function. The specific solution is irrelevant to 
this discussion. 
We now focus our attention on after-tax-efficient port-
folios. Here, when dealing with cash flows, we must note 
that taxes are due. An investor holding one unit of asset 
 will have to deliver the amount j  j jY A   to the 
tax authority. Efficient portfolios are those, which for 
any given variance and nominal wealth  , will maxi-
mize the expected value e . The expected cash flows 
after taxes then amount to   1A E E E A      . 
The pre-tax covariance matrix   changes to the 
post-tax covariance matrix  
   
 2
Cov 1 , 1
1 Cov ,




   

A     
    
 
   
Thus, we now have to maximize the function 
  1N E A   
N p
 under the budget constraints 
   and  2 21N N     . So long as the 
amount of write-offs A  is not specified, there are many 
solutions to this problem. However, in a one-period 
model, A p  represents a plausible-even natural- 
choice. The function to be maximized now takes the 
1If cash flows are not perfectly negatively correlated there are 
no portfolios having zero variance. Therefore, there is a mini-
mum variance that cannot be undercut. 
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form  1N E     . Since a positive linear transfor-
mation will affect the target function but not the solution 
itself, we can similarly denote the optimization problem 
after taxes in the form 
Nmax N E                  (3) 
under auxiliary conditions 
 
2
2anN p d 1
N N        (4)  
2
   
We recognize at once: The maximization problem af-
ter taxes differs from that before taxes in only one, and 
furthermore irrelevant, respect. In the second budget con-




 . It follows 
that the set of all parameters for both maximization 
problems must be identical. The efficient set before taxes 
coincides with the efficient set after taxes. 
 
2.3. Tax-Minimizing Portfolios 
 
We begin by stating that, in the context of our discussion, 
it is not immediately clear what tax avoidance or tax 
minimization mean. We see several possible ways to 
specify the concept of tax minimization, if we are deal-
ing with identifying a risky portfolio. Four specific al-
ternatives shall be considered. In each case, we will as-
sume that the risky projects will be completely written 
off, thus A p . 
 
2.3.1. Minimizing Taxes in the Worst-Case Scenario 
To formalize this concept of tax minimization, we as-
sume that the number of relevant states at time 1t   is 
finite and that the state-dependent cash flows of assets 
can be characterized by . Then   , 1, ,Y s s S 
  N Y s p N  Y s      describes the tax pay-
ments coming due for an investor if the state s  occurs 
in . In the worst case, this payment will amount to 1
 N Y s
t
max s  
min
N
. Our first version of tax minimiza-
tion may amount to choosing portfolio  in such a 




N Y s   
under auxiliary constraint N p   . The solution can 
be found by means of an appropriate algorithm of linear 
programming. It is obvious that such a solution is not 
 - 2 -efficient. 
 
2.3.2. Absolute Minimization of Expected Taxes 
The expected tax payments of portfolio  amount to N
N E p    . Due to the budget restriction N p   , the 
optimization problem reads 
 min
N
N E   , 
if no additional auxiliary conditions are taken into ac-
count. The solution is not lower-bound. The expected tax 
payment tends towards infinite minus. This result does 
not make economic sense. 
 
2.3.3. Fading Expected Taxes 
In order to avoid the just mentioned outcome, we can 
restrict the search for a portfolio, for which the expected 
tax payments disappear, i.e., 
  ! 0N E    . 
For a positive tax rate, the expected tax payment will 
tend towards zero if the basis of assessment disappears. 
This is the case, if the expected payments from the port-
folio are equal to the invested capital, a slightly surpris-
ing, but equally disappointing outcome. Without earning 
no taxes are due. But would someone cancel one's net 
earnings in order to save taxes? This would be as unrea-
sonable as if a firm maximized its wages in order to 
minimize corporate taxes. 
 
2.3.4. Minimizing Expected Taxes on a Given Variance 




N E    




N p N N         
this version of tax minimization we do not have any 
economics-driven intuition, excluding maybe that the 
determination of an efficient portfolio without taking 
variance into account does not seem possible. As the 
constants in the target function can be ignored, we can 
rewrite it in the form . Comparing this opti-
mization problem with the procedure involving Equa-
tions (1) and (2), it becomes immediately clear, that no 
minN N E
 - 2 -efficient portfolios can be determined in this 
manner. A rational investor does not minimize the ex-





In the framework of a simple portfolio model with taxes 
it was considered whether the strategy of tax avoidance 
will lead to  - 2 -efficient solutions. The examination 
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of four distinct concepts of tax minimization strategy has 
proven that each of them (by far) misses an efficient so-
lution. Thus, when evaluating companies, one must 
avoid the classic CAPM for determining beta factors and 
should instead employ a Tax-CAPM. 
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